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Preface to Death of a Crow
The nuclear phenomenon in South Asia was inaugurated with its brutal consequence in May 1974 by
killing an innocent crow as its first victim.  As one story has it, a crow that flew in and sat on top of the
explosion site as the zero hour arrived, was blown out by the blast (Mian 1998) It was ironic in the sense
that the killing of the crow unknowingly completed the Hindu rituals of sacrificing animals or birds
when worshipping any machine or tools for future use.  Again, it was doubly ironic for a person, Homi
Bhabha, who ignited the nuclear fuse in South Asia for the first time, to be born as a Parsi, and the
Parsies are supposed to be crow eaters.  Homi Bhabha, the first Indian scientists, who initiated the
nuclear research in India in the early 1940s, though, did not live to see his dreams come true, the leader-
ship that took the decision for India to go nuclear, however, was also a Parsi by conjugal relationships.
The late prime minister Indira Gandhi’s decision to conduct the Pokhran 1 test was never a decision
invoked by any strategic consideration.  It was rather a decision with domestic politics in mind to revive
the declining popularity of the Congress-I government led by Indira Gandhi.  The grandeur of Pokhran
1 significantly surged the popularity of the prime minister though it was temporal and did not help her to
rule India for long even with the imposition of emergency in 1975.
The domestic factor was also particularly pronounced in India leading to the May 11 and 13, 1998
nuclear tests that the fragile government formed by the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) constituting thirteen-
odd coalition groups had promised its electorate.  The mood of festivities surrounding the blasts had led
the BJP supporters thinking about distributing the sand from the test sites around the country (like the
Moon rocks brought by Apollo 11 distributed around the world) as they were distributing sweets to the
passersby on the streets.  In jubilation, some BJP leaders had also talked about building a monument at
Pokhran test site as a‘shrine of strength,’ as the tests were conducted under a code-name ‘Operation
Shakti,’ meaning power.  One strategic analyst had gone to the extent of eulogizing prime minister
Vajpayee as the “prince of peace” by being a person to exercise his authority to achieve “peace through
deterrence” with nuclear tests (Chellaney 1998a).  But as all things must pass, the sense of euphoria
quickly turned into a pall of gloom.  The series of predictable nuclear tests by Pakistan on May 28 and
30, 1998 not only had the sobering effect on India but also robbed the glow from its motive of becoming
a ‘global player.’ Pakistan’s raising of the nuclear ante has much challenged the perspective of one of
India’s hard core nuclear strategists, K. Subrahmanyam (1998), who has been advocating that the
nuclear weapon is not an issue, but the rights of India to exercise the nuclear option as a major power
where one sixth of humanity inhabit, to be equal.  India’s decision to go nuclear, as the title of an earlier
article of the incumbent Indian Minister for External Affairs Jaswant Singh suggests in the Foreign
Affairs, is actually ‘Against Nuclear Apartheid’ (Singh 1998) The frustrating experience of India against
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the denial and recognition of its major power ambitions by the international community has ultimately
led it to claim the cherished nuclear weapons power status.
On the other hand, when asked about the need to detonate the nuclear device, prime minister Nawaz
Sharif of Pakistan explained that it was forced to do so by India and the compulsion behind the nuclear
tests was much related with the Indian tests.  According to him: ‘It was a question of our survival.  Our
security was in grave danger’ (Time, November 30, 1998.) And as the logic has it, in its quest for a
major power status induced by the national pride to parlay itself into grabbing a permanent seat in the
United Nations Security Council, India now finds itself condemned to coexist with a nuclear-armed
Pakistan on an equal footing rather than as a predominant power in South Asia with considerable mili-
tary edge.
The 1974 Pokhran 1 blast has created a scientific momentum towards the 1998 tests and the subse-
quent counter-tests.  South Asian security dilemma that has also graduated to encompass the nuclear
dimension now awaits its tragic consequences: the lightening of a nuclear fire in South Asia that con-
sumed a crow is a preface to the South Asian nuclear politics questioning the imperatives behind the
thinking of the declining utility of nuclear weapons.  The fallacies of the nuclear non-proliferation
regime as well as the rationality of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and its future are now on the
spotlight.  Although the South Asian tests have led to qualify the positions of the possessionists in the
region and around the world, the tests have, however, not changed the strategic equation in South Asia.
The presumption that nuclear weapons are the ultimate weapons for preserving peace is yet to be proven
true in the region desperately seeking an alternate future to conflicts, crises and mounting violence.
Evidently, the new round of festering conflict and the war of attrition in Kashmir with artillery duels on
the ground supported by the Indian fighter aircraft this summer for the first time has also belied the opti-
mism born after the Lahore Declaration of February 21, 1999 that conflict management as a means of
settling disputes would reduce the risk of all out war between India and Pakistan against the presence of
nuclear weapons.
Thus, this article modestly attempts to unravel the features why, despite the logic behind the nuclear
tests, the security environment in South Asia would not improve with the possession of the nuclear
weapons.  Instead, as the post-1998 developments show, the Indo-Pak rivalries will intensify than stabi-
lize, which, as a matter of fact, will cause by the existence of nuclear weapons in the region.
Nuclear Junkies
Actually, the South Asian leaderships are not among the believers who see the nuclear weapons as the
relics of the bygone Cold War.  Instead, their possessionist urge have been dramatically raised by the
end of the Cold War and the subsequent events leading them to live in a situation of strategic orphanage.
Five factors have pushed them towards a thinking about the imperatives of nuclear weapons for their
security.  First, the imposition of the Pressler Amendment by the Bush Administration in 1990 stopped
the source of sophisticated arms supplies to Pakistan.  Second, the disappearance and the subsequent
breakup of the Soviet Union had led to make India’s reliable source of arms supply non-existent.  Third,
the ever shrinking foreign exchange reserve along with increasing indebtedness forced both of these
rivals to constrict their military expenditure.  Fourth, the Chinese military ascendancy, particularly for
India, was a constant reminder of strategic imbalance in the cis-Himalaya region with perceived threat
from across the border to Indian security interests.
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Fifth, the most awe-inspiring experience for both India and Pakistan was the lessons from the Gulf
War that demonstrated the utility of high-tech weapons and their devastating consequences.  The Gulf
War was not only fought in the desert battle fields and the dark skies over the Middle East, it was actual-
ly fought in the drawing rooms of the world television viewers with the message of the ‘Unipolar
World’ with the flashing of the American arms’ might by the CNN.  As one estimate has it, in its histori-
cally unprecedented aerial bombing, the US-led allied attack dropped more explosives in the first two
weeks of the 42 day long Gulf war than in the entire course of the World War II.  The 350MI Tanks
Armoured Division of the United States used more fuel oil during the Gulf War in comparison to the
fuel oil used by the US 3rd.  Army during its invasion of Germany in 1944-1945 (McLaunchlan and
Hooks 1995).  Indeed, the Gulf War was a scientific feat: it was interesting to watch the submarine
based Tomahawk missile fired from a distance of some 800km.  silently entering a residental building
with a slight knock in one of its several windows and suddenly bursting into a fireball with its dehuman-
izing consequences.  Desert Storm had actually stormed the conscience of humanity.
For both India and Pakistan the war in the future with the use of precision weapons, however, remains
a fantasy.  Neither would it be affordable nor would it be possible in the projectable future.  And the
hunches had it that had Iraq possessed the nuclear weapons, the US would never have engaged and com-
mitted its forces in the Gulf.  Contemplations like this over the board led the leaderships both in India
and Pakistan to conclude that the possession of nuclear weapon would be cheaper than buying an unit of
the F-16 fighter bomber (TI, July13, 1995.) The extraordinarily arrogant French nuclear tests in the
South Pacific in 1995 which faces no considerable threat but claims its security depends on nuclear
capabilities had also deeply influenced the conviction both in India and Pakistan that nuclear weapons
should be the logical choice.  They also displayed a strong reservation against the fact that even after the
end of the Cold War, the nuclear weapons powers retain some 35 000 nuclear warheads.
Hence, the reality is that neither the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty’s (NPT) indefinite extension
1995 nor the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 1996 prohibit the so-called ‘subcritical tests’ by
the nuclear weapons powers to keep their nuclear arsenals effective and alive.  More disheartening for
the non-nuclear world, including India and Pakistan, was the World Court Advisory Decision in 1996.
Its suggestion that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be ‘contrary to the rules of
international law applicable in armed conflict and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian
law, except in an extreme circumstance of self defence in which the very survival of the state would be
at stake’ (ICJ 1996) makes the nuclear weapons the trappings of the real power.  The decision stops well
short of recommending the abolition of nuclear weapons by delegitimizing it, as the International Court
of Justice is also predominantly an institution under the influence of the major nuclear weapons powers.
The World Court restricts the use of nuclear weapons in armed conflicts in general but did not suggest
the use itself is illegitimate.  The lacunae is that humanitarian law does not govern either the possession
or the use of nuclear weapons.  Nor is international law observable in the context of defining the
‘extreme circumstance’ properly because national interests and security stakes are defined in  accor-
dance with the perceptions of the indigenous leaderships in conflicts not by the lawyers in the World
Court.  Again, war itself could affect the human mind because of the war being in itself an abnormal sit-
uation.  The moral degeneration caused by war could lead leaders to unlease barbarity.  On the other
hand, the recommendations of the Canberra Commission published in August 1996 strongly urging the
world to move towards the elimination of nuclear weapons with the global adoption of ‘no first use’ pol-
icy was also counterpoised by the policies of major nuclear weapons powers (CanberraCommission
1996.) The Russians have given an enhanced role for the nuclear weapons by justifying the necessity of
the weapons to cope with future challenges from the South in the course of delinking their strategic rela-
tionships from the US-Russian context (Schell 1998.) Similarly, the US Presidential Decision Directive
on Nuclear Posture Review of 1997 has continued to maintain the conviction that the nuclear weapons
are the ultimate weapon of security (Schell 1998.) 
These international conditioning when translated into the South Asian context would suggest three
prominent reasons behind the Indian nuclear tests.  The first is the budding non-proliferation pressure,
the second is the failure of disarmament goal, and, the third is the perceived increasing capabilities of
India’s rivals jeopardizing its security interests.
The unconditional and indefinite extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1995
signed by 185 states, according to India, has provided with the required legitimacy to retain the dreadful
weapons to the five nuclear weapons powers.  Though Article VI of the NPT calls for a complete elimi-
nation of nuclear weapons by foreclosing the chances for a country like India to exercise its nuclear
option, none of powers committed to the Article have taken any constructive steps to achieve the goal.
Likewise, the CTBT overruled the Indian position on setting a time frame for elimination of nuclear
weapons.  Instead, it stipulated a ‘entry into force’ clause stating that the treaty will not take effect
unless India and the rest of 42 leftover countries ratify it.  Accordingly, any country that fails to ratify
the treaty within the three years of its opening for signature in 1996 would face an unspecified counter-
measure consistent with international law.  Actually, the ‘entry into force’ provision is the ultimate dis-
play of insensitivity by the five nuclear weapons powers to the Vienna Convention that stipulates that no
treaty could be enforced under duress.  However, the irony is that the CTBT also permits the signatories
to withdraw from the treaty in the ultimate interests of their national security.  Thus the CTBT has failed
to resolve the persistent conflict of interests pervading the world.  It has also failed in meeting, as James
Laue has suggested in some other context, the basic criterion of some ‘mutually agreed upon standards
of fairness and justice,’ (Laue 1993) when resolving conflict of interests pertaining to the evolving secu-
rity order.
As a consequence, India’s perceived national security interests in the regional context appeared to
have been thoroughly undermined by both the NPT and CTBT arrangements.  This claim of India is
premised on the strategic development in the region.  Particularly, the ever strengthening Sino-Pakistani
strategic relationships have been pointed out by India as a reason for strategic instability in South Asia.
The letter that the Indian prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee wrote to the US president Clinton on
May11,1998 (which was deliberately leaked to the New York Times) had succinctly explained the reason
behind the Indian nuclear tests: 
...We have an overt nuclear weapons state on our borders, a state which committed armed aggression
against India in 1962.  Although our relations with that country have improved...  an atmosphere of dis-
trust persists mainly due to the unresolved border problem.  To add to the distrust, that country has
materially helped another neighbor of ours to become a covert nuclear weapons state.  At the hands of
this bitter neighbor we have suffered three aggressions in the last 50 years (NYT, May 13, 1998.)
Understandably, China’s defence modernization programme with increasing nuclear arsenals along
with Dongfeng 31 missile with a range to cover the whole subcontinent; its unflinching support to
Pakistan on nuclear field, and the perceived naval expansion in the Indian Ocean through the Burmese
(Myanmar) shores has cast an unease in the Indian strategic community.  For some the efforts to contain
the ‘dragon next door’ through diplomacy was inadequate on the part of India (Chellaney 1998b.) 
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The real crunch, however, came when Pakistan successfully tested its 1500 km.  Ghauri missile in
April 1998 - allegedly a varient of either Chinese or North Korean design.  The Ghauri has ultimately
quashed the Indian sense of strategic depth vis a vis Pakistan forcing it to reconsider its nuclear option
and come out with open blast.  As explained by prime minister Vajpayee, India’s security concerns
revolve around the Sino-Pak nexus that can be only checkmated by the possession of a ‘big bomb.’ The
nuclear weapons in South Asia, therefore, have two major rationale: it is the ultimate defiance of India
against the discriminatory global security regime based on the privy of five declared nuclear weapons
powers and 16 crypto-nuclear weapons states living under the nuclear umbrella.  Second, the security
imperatives of India and Pakistan, more so that of Pakistan, have led both to become nuclear junkies
whose status as nuclear weapons powers would always be questioned under the present structure of NPT
treaty.
Security Problematique
The killing of a crow that heralded the nuclear phenomenon in South Asia has become much of a
metaphor in 1998 when in an act of fury India destroyed the incipient attempt at constructing a global
security regime under the banner of NPT and CTBT.  In other words, India has particularly put on notice
that the objective of maintaining the nuclear status quo of the five nuclear weapons powers is no more
contingent to its security interests (Ghose 1996.) Past experiences, as the denial of a nuclear umbrella to
India by the superpowers and Britain in the aftermath of the Chinese nuclear test in 1964, and the
American infirmities in providing alliance support to Pakistan in the subsequent Indo-Pak wars in 1965
and 1971 have strengthened the resolve in both of these countries to achieve strategic independence
through nuclear weapons possession.  In addition, the Pakistani request for the nuclear umbrella was
again denied by the United States in May 1998 after the Indian nuclear tests (NYT, May 30, 1998), nor
had China reconciled to the idea (Rosenthal 1998), which understandably compelled Pakistan to match
Indian tests.  As both India and Pakistan are not governed either by NPT or CTBT security regimes, they
have not violated any rules or norms set by these treaties by becoming nuclear weapons powers.Though
India in particular did not violate any international law by becoming nuclear weapons power, it violated
the humanitarian norm and commitment made back in 1964 by signing and inscribing the Gong in
Hiroshima by the then Indian Ambassador to Japan, Lalji Mehrotra, with a dedication never to seek
security through the weapons of mass destruction.
It was the crow they killed that was crowing over their heads since long.  It was the heroic feat both
India and Pakistan achieved separately which was also supported by over 90 percent of opinion polls
held immediately after the blasts.  It was a bang for the bang once the ‘minds at war’ (Kull 1988) have
no other resolution in sight for the festering problems in their relationships.  The deepseated psychologi-
cal animosity persisting between India and Pakistan has perceptibly become a case for rationalizing their
nuclear possession (Goldgeier 1997; Cashman 1993.) Actually, the drive for becoming nuclear weapons
power was not threat driven but status driven.  The grandiosed vision of India as a great power seeking
parity with China and Pakistan’s status consciousness to be at par with India, at the end, had led both of
them to do a copy cat.  The utterly depressing situation in which both of these countries live today with
a sense that they have ‘hit the rock bottom’ have questioned all the arguments put forth by the leader-
ships in these two countries prior to and in the aftermath of the nuclear tests.
Despite the logic advanced to rationalize the process of overt nuclearization in South Asia, the tests,
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however, have failed to address the primary objective of enhancing national security of both India and
Pakistan.  The conspicuous absence of any semblance of security regime in the region, defined by Jervis
(1982) as ‘those principles, rules, and norms that permit nations to be restrained in their behavior in the
belief that others will reciprocate...  a form of cooperation that is more than the following of short run
self-interest,’ could lead to unpredictable consequences.  This unpredictability in the behavioural persua-
sion of security both in India and Pakistan questions the logic behind the conception of deterrence as a
fundamental underpinning for the possession of nuclear weapons.  Deterrence  which is construed on the
principle of mutual assured destruction (MAD) has never considered the human falliability as a possibli-
ty.  Therefore, the concept is both intellectually untenable and functionally impracticable.  Intellectually,
deterrence requires transparency and cooperation between the deadly adversaries and willingness to
restrain temptations to unlease nuclear forces expecting the same attitude governs the motivation on the
opposite side.  Functionally, it is impracticable because deterrence requires the constant and continuous
efforts to optimize nuclear forces structure and readiness to use it to annihilate the opponent with serious
repraisal.  Thus will ‘cooperation under security dilemma’ occure through heightening the balance of
terror?
This balance of terror was particularly assumed to have produced the believe of ‘existential deter-
rence’ in the period of opacity between India and Pakistan.  According to some of the prominent Indian
as well as Pakistani military Generals, nonweaponized deterrence had played its role during the largest
Indian military exercise ‘Operation Brasstacks’ in 1986-87 and the violent flareup in Kashmir in 1990 in
war prevention (Hagerty, 1998; Bajpai, et.al., 1995; Hersh, 1993.) The fourth Indo-Pakistani war was
averted, according to a leader of Pakistan’s Muslim League Party, M. Ijan Ul Haq (the son of late presi-
dent Zia Ul Haq) because his father had convinced the late Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi about
Pakistani nuclear capability with the words ‘ I also possess what you possess,’ (TA, August 19, 1996)
during the former’s visit to New Delhi under the guise of famous ‘cricket diplomacy.’ Among the
prominent believers were the former Chief of Army Staff, General Sundarji of India who felt that had
his country possessed nuclear weapons all the past wars would have been averted (Sundarji, 1993,
1994.) His counterpart Pakistani General Mirza Aslam Beg is of the view that the bifurcation of
Pakistan could have been averted in 1971 had Pakistan possessed nuclear weapons (Beg, 1994.)
In India, deterrence is conceived as a double-edge sword to prevent the Sino-Pak nexus and to foil the
possibility of a two front war.  The Chinese threat that does not actually exists was the mantra for the
Indian strategic community to continue to maintain a momentum towards nuclearization of South Asia.
According to them, the Chinese expansionist policy is evident in its occupation of 38 000 sq km.  of
Indian territory in Aksai Chin, and the claim over 90 000 sq km.  of territory in the Arunachal Pradesh.
Likewise, India has 740 km.  long disputed border with Pakistan.  Besides the invocation of the Chinese
threat, according to some, it also serves a number of Indian foreign policy objectives:’ It elevates India’s
international status...  justifies high defence spending; legitimatizes India’s nuclear and missile pro-
grammes and demands for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council; undermines Pakistan’s attempt
to gain strategic parity with India; and diverts attention from India’s regional supremacy ambitions to
China’s expansionist designs...’ (Malik, 1995) thereby bringing India closer to the anti-China lobbies
both in domestic and foreign context.
These flawed precepts may be correct in unnecessarily intensifying India’s conflict interactions with
China.  But whether China’s interests would be served by generating conflicts with India likewise
remain beyond consideration in conceptualizing the Chinese threat.  This flawed assessment has led
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India’s nuclear policy to be wrongly defined.  This statement will be explained later on.
Precisely speaking, there are an array of disincentives than incentives for nuclear weapons possession
and their expansion through weaponization with the development of delivery system, if the purpose of
nuclear weapons and delivery systems are for deterrence in practice.  Deterrence between nuclear adver-
saries is simply thought to be more effective in regulating conflict duly because nuclear threat requires
nuclear responses to caution the behaviour of the opponent.  The reality behind this assumption has been
questioned by the empirical evidences marshalled so far in the context of the Cold war.  For example,
the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 was the best managed cold war crisis when the world was on the brink
of nuclear precipice.  If one were to review the literature on the Cuban missile crisis Retrospective
Meetings and the recently released Kennedy Tapes, it would be sufficient to suggest, according to
Robert McNamara, the then US Defense Secretary who actually instituted the doctrine of deterrence and
the MAD theory, that there was no talks of nuclear deterrence during the crisis.  ‘It is no credit to us that
we missed nuclear war, at least, we had to be lucky as well as wise,’ he says (May and Zelikow, 1997.)
Bruce Blair, now a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Washington DC, who had served as the
US Air Force Launch Control Officer responsible for the Minuteman Nuclear missiles in Montana, has
pointed out in his early writing Strategic Command and Control published in 1985 about the extreme
vulnerability of the US Command and Control systems.  On the basis of his practical experiences he
doubted even the US capability of delivering a single prompt and massive retaliatory attack that is con-
sidered a sin qua none of nuclear deterrence.  Subsequently, he has suggested that the thinking about
deterrence that worked during the Cold War to save the world from the nuclear holocaust simply never
quite existed (Blair, 1994.)
General George Lee Butler (1997), who retired in 1994 after heading the US Strategic Command, was
of the opinion that the Soviet Union was never amenable to the concept of deterrence.  Their nuclear
doctrine was based on the war fighting and war winning capabilities; they never thought about loosing
the nuclear war with the United States.  They had not realized the devastating consequences that the
nuclear weapons could cause until very late in 1986 when Chernobyle led them to directly experience it.
Thus deterrence as conceptualized was uniquely a Western construct, it was not operational in the Soviet
mind during much of the tense period of the Cold War.  Likewise, Richard Lebow had earlier pointed
out that the paramount weakness of the deterrence theory has been its ignoring of the difficulties associ-
ated with the signalling process which could breakdown, be blocked as well as distorted.  The prospect
of decapitation of the command, control, communication and intelligence (C3I) could entirely make the
assumption of attaining an unambiguous signalling process defunct.  Such a command vulnerability
could become a major source of nuclear instability to increase the prospects of the weapons’ use
(Lebow, 1985.)
Securing Insecurity
Thinking about nuclear weapons vary in South Asia.  For India, nuclear weapon is the weapon of last
resort as its ‘no first use’ proposal indicates.  Whereas for Pakistan which senses that India had tried to
kill the prospect of its nuclear deterrence through the ‘no first use’ agreement, it is ‘now or never’ phe-
nomenon.  The worth of nuclear weapons for Pakistan is in its use whenever it feels its national security
interests are jeopardised by the conventional Indian armed invasion.  This diametrically opposite view
on the utility and the use of nuclear weapons leads one to contemplate about the reality of situation sur-
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rounding South Asian strategic landscape opening up further to severe vulnerabilities.  First, South Asia
is a region where technical sophistication for the workable C3I is far from available.  This is also a
region where all four wars previously had started without any notice and where nuclear threat currently
has become a policy imperative, particularly between India and Pakistan.  The fresh testimony to this
pattern of interaction is traceable in the words of the Indian Home Minister Lal Krishna Advani against
Pakistan to hands off Kashmir immediately after the May 11 nuclear tests, warning the latter to consider
the strategic change in the region.  This warning reportedly had raised the conflict threshold in the
region leaving Pakistan with no other alternative than to blast and go bust.  On May 27, 1998, one day
before the Pak nuclear tests, the Indian Army’s Signals Intelligence Directorate intercepted a coded
telegram altering the Pakistani High Commission in New Delhi that Islamabad had ‘credible informa-
tion’ that India was about to carry out a pre-dawn attack on Pak nuclear installations.  India’s prompt
denial of such intensions did not led to reassure Pakistan.  Instead, Pakistan clamped down a state of
emergency suspending its democratic constitution under the pretext of the impending external threat
after the nuclear tests.  The Indo-Pak tests not only proved the inadequacy of nonweaponized or existen-
tial deterrence, these also suggest about the lack of trust and transparency in their relationships.  Thus,
deterrence, in whatever form, does not resolve conflict.  Rather it makes conflict abound.  Deterrence
lacks one principle element for cooperation that is reassurance that could change the behavioural pattern
leading even deadly rivals to seek alternative towards the formation of a working relationships in miti-
gating conflicts (Stein, 1991.)
Second, closely linked with the operationalization of C3I is the channel and process of verification to
determine the correctness and reliability of the information.  The past behavioural patterns, however
were disappointing in this case even at the conventional footings.  As said earlier, all the wars in South
Asia begin without notice, they were eventually a consequence of misreading and misinterpretation of
the signalling processes.  Military superiority and inferiority were hardly a factor in both Indian and
Pakistani decision making while waging wars.  Therefore, conventional deterrence in South Asia in the
past was always a failure.  Pakistan fought three wars against India when in a militarily inferior situa-
tion.  But the military inferiority did not prevent it to take strategic initiatives.  Likewise, the case with
India was also the same vis-a-vis China but its ‘forward policy’ created the condition for the border war
in 1962.  In the wars in South Asia war initiations were the weaker powers’ game plan when the
stronger rivals were in trouble.  Deterrence signalling from the stronger adversaries had failed to prevent
these wars.  In all these cases misperception and miscalculation had played a role in the conflict escala-
tion which was allowed to occur because the provocateures in all these cases were significantly inferior
and had been threatened in advance with severe reprisals (Dhruba Kumar, 1997.)
The conflict behavioural pattern drawn from the past shows that military asymmetries were not the
cause of these wars.  Rather the precious absence of rationality in decision making processes had drifted
these countries towards perilous conflicts.  Such were the cases repeated both during the Brasstacks mil-
itary exercise in 1986/87 by India and the flare up in Kashmir in 1990 that had virtually led India and
Pakistan to the brink of war, perhaps with the potentiality of nuclear exchange (Hersh, 1993; Burrow
and Windren, 1994.) These cases also suggest about the imprudence and unpredictability in decision
making process prevalent even in democratic India, that had put its own prime minister (the supreme
commander and decision maker) in the dark till the eleventh hour (particularly during the Brasstacks
exercises.) Reportedly, the minister of state for Defence, Arun Singh, and the Chief of Army Staff,
General K. Sunderji had plan to provoke Pakistan into a war even when these two countries were at
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peace diplomatically (Bajpai, et.al., 1995; Rikhye, 1989; Rikhye, 1990.) Furthermore, every peace
efforts have been followed by the conflict displaying the prominent characteristics of the dysfunctional
relationships between India and Pakistan.  Recently, the Lahore Declaration of February 21, 1999,
which promised a new beginning in their relations, unfortunately, did not consummated into diplomatic
negotiations but erupted into renewed conflict in May that lasted more than ten weeks before subsiding
after severe international pressure forcing them to step back from the brink of an all out war.
Certainly, the past conflict pattern wrapped in ambiguity cannot be conducive to the objective of
nuclear deterrence in the future.  The lack of transparency in the Indo-Pak strategic interactions would
always lead both of the adversaries to guess that either of them could achieve attack capability by
improving both quality and quantity of their respective weaponry.  In a situation where the intentions of
the opponent are always a suspect, the operationalization of deterrence would be a fantasy.  Similarly, in
weapons stock and capability, India would remain far superior to Pakistan in the foreseeable future.
Pakistan, as being the weaker power and also a nonadherent to the concept of no fist use, will always be
tempted to take the nuclear initiatives first with now or never feelings because even as the nuclear expo-
nent scholar Kenneth Waltz suggests, the lesser nuclear weapons powers may ‘destroy themselves
through restoring to nuclear weapons’ (Waltz, 1981) use first in case of the threat to their national sur-
vival.  As the cases of Brasstacks 1986/87 and resurgence in Kashmir 1990 suggest, Pakistan had report-
edly taken the nuclear initiatives against the overwhelming conventional military power of India (Hersh,
1993.) This possibility then was doubted (Krepon and Farugee, 1994; Hagerty 1995-96; Hagerty, 1998.)
But given the context of overt nuclearization, the technological push towards weaponization, and the
deployment of theater ballistic missiles without basic C3I, the possibility of any false alarm in the future
becoming the first and the last in the subcontinent cannot also be negated.
Thus, in the context of C3I’s effectiveness and vulnerability, geography plays a critical role in the
nuclear discourses of South Asia.  The nuclear rivals in South Asia are geographically contiguous.  In
the Indo-Pakistani context, a commercial aircraft flight from New Delhi to Lahore takes around 45 min-
utes.  Both India and Pakistan possesses a sizable number of nuclear mission capable missiles and air-
craft.  The flight time for a quick-reaction fighter bomber from its base to target would usually be
between 15 to 30 minutes or even more.  Since aircraft can be recalled catastrophy can be averted even
in the last minute.  This is not so with ballistic missiles.  Missiles which are invulnerable to the risk of
interception can reach from one target to another within 3 to 6 minutes in the South Asian strategic tra-
jectory.  A comparable time from the erstwhile Soviet Union to the United States is 30 minutes.  In the
cross Atlantic context, as Blair has noted, the lift off of a land based missile from the Soviet soil could
be detected within 30 seconds; a conference of US decision makers will take five minutes to convene;
within 20 or so minutes the presidential decision will have to be made and filtered down as order for
retaliation; the order processed and successfully executed.  Obviously, these deadlines place an extraor-
dinary pressure on the entire decision making process.  This is the case in relations to the land based
missiles (ICBMs).  If the missiles were to be fired from the submarine the lift off and the hit time is
around twelve minutes (Blair, 1994.) The lessons from the Cold War, therefore, was that even with the
‘sophisticated’ C3I and the institutionalized chain of command with the regular CBMs (Confidence
Building Measures) at places, the superpowers had come to the brink of conflict several times by read-
ing each other wrongly.
It is easier for one to imagine the way decisions could be made in the context of the South Asian mis-
sile trajectory.  Within the short span of 3 to 6 minutes decisions will have to be taken whether the alarm
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is genuine, whether the missiles are presumed to be carrying the nuclear warheads and whether the mis-
siles are fired from the presumed enemy territory.  (The case of the US sending immediately its high
level official, the Deputy Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph Ralston to Pakistan in
August 1998 when its missiles landed in Afghanistan/Pakistan border had sensitively displayed the pos-
sibility of Pak reacting against India thinking that the missiles were fired from the Indian territory.) The
short time however constrains the worth of information processing and verifying its reliability.  Again
reliability of information hardly matters in the Indo-Pak context.  Because the case in South Asia previ-
ously was that the envious intelligence agencies thrive on supplying misinformation; there are records of
the field commanders of the armed forces not using direct hotlines and its shut down during the crisis.
The hot border with eye-ball-to-eye-ball military deployment can burst anytime.  An envious military
commander can trigger the conflict and one never knows about the consequence.  Because irrationality
governs the strategic as well as political mindset in the Indo-Pak context as it is evident, among others,
in the long drawn out conflict at the Siachen Glacier.  Neither India nor Pakistan has ever shown any
eagerness towards this particular conflict resolution which cost each of them $2 million a day just to put
forces intact in the glacier situated over 16000ft.  altitude.  Thus, since ad hocism in decision makings is
prevalent and reliable information so scarce the only alternative for either of the party in conflict will be
to adopt the launch on warning or launch on short notice principle as nuclear doctrine.  Strategies like
these are inherently fraught with the danger of possible misinterpretation of the nuclear signalling.
Besides this, Pakistani nuclear strategy is moreover based on the pre-emptive strike in the case of fail-
ure of the warning to prevent India from moving its formidable conventional forces to the threatening
positions across the border.  Pakistan strategic doctrine of offensive defence would therefore establish
an enduring crisis situation compelling both India and Pakistan to remain perpetually on nuclear alert.
But with the development of a second strike capability by India, as its no first use doctrine indicates, this
option enhancing  policy of Pakistan would be compromised to the extent of creating a situation in
which India would be in a position to reduce Pakistan to ashes whereas Pakistan’s ability to do so would
be geographically impossible.  The calculus of deterrence could change the behaviour of the rivals to the
detriment of the national survival.  Previous wars in South Asia were mostly border skirmishes fought
between the combatants avoiding the civilian casualties and destruction of valuable assets.  Deterrence
is presumably based on the principle of the risk of the destruction of countervalue targets than counter-
force targets.  In case of the nuclear conflagration what would be the difference between countervalue or
counterforce targets if Sind and the Punjab in Pakistan are hit by thermonuclear bombs’ Likewise, the
bomb’s hit on the political and command leadership in New Delhi or even Bombay will not only destroy
the army cantonments and naval shipyards but also envelop the cities and population surrounding the
epicentre.  Estimates vary on the deaths that the use of nuclear weapons can cause in these cities but
they are all horrendous.  The densely populated major cities of India and Pakistan, their transportation
bottlenecks, slums and collapsing old buildings in the cities, negligible availability of emergency relief,
low medical facilities etc., all could add up to the number of instant deaths caused by radiation, derbis
and health hazards.  The possibility of a holocaust has become a reality only with the possession of
nuclear weapons and the missile delivery systems by India as well as Pakistan.
Another crucial feature of insecurity introduced by the nuclear weapons in South Asia is the uncer-
tainty in Sino-Indian relations.  The reason is that China has been identified by the government of India
as the formidable enemy which was never a case before despite India’s humiliating defeat in the 1962
War.  The notable improvement in the Sino-Indian relationships, particularly, after Rajiv Gandhi’s visit
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to Beijing in December 1988 and the signing of several accords along with CBMs across the disputed
border have all now become immaterial in front of the Indian official assertion that its nuclear weapons
are meant for preventing Chinese expansionist policies as well as assistance to Pakistan to potentially
become a nuclear weapons power.  The perceived Chinese threat has long been a cause for India in
rationalizing nuclear proliferation with nationalist fervour.  Its determination to break the Chinese
nuclear monopoly in Asia has thus unqualified support throughout the nation.  It does not matter then
whether China poses any threat both in conventional and nuclear terms.  Suffice it to say that the posses-
sion of nuclear weapons by China as an adversary is definitely a threat because of the past history and
yet unresolved border problems.
In the Indian contingency planning the Chinese threat has remained the most potential problem for the
future.  The Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme constituted in 1983 to build Agni mis-
sile in particular was considerably influenced by the perception of a looming Chinese threat.  The Agni
ballistic missile, when fully developed, will be able to reach the eastern seaboard regions of China with
a 1000kg payload of nuclear warheads.  The development of Agni missile is fundamentally addressed
towards altering India’s geographically disadvantageous position vis-a-vis China.  Because most of the
prosperous and valuable targets in China are beyond the reach of fighter bombers that India currently
possesses.  Perhaps the acquisition of the SU-30 long range bomber from Russia by India may enable it
to cover most of the Chinese territory.  This sophisticated aircraft is not invulnerable to detection and
interception, however.  Therefore, the Agni missile development along with the nuclear tests by India
have further enlarged the ‘circumference of conflict,’ to borrow Martin Navias’ (1990) term, by convert-
ing the perceived nuclear threat from China into a reality for India.
Before May 1998 China was least concerned with any conceivable threat from India except in the case
that New Delhi may become a factor for destabilization in Tibet.  Chinese diplomacy has successfully
neutralized the Tibetan issue at the governmental level with India until the coming to power of the
Bhartiya Janata Party government with a socialist defence minister George Fernandes, a longtime Free
Tibet activist Fernandes was the first Indian political leader with crucial defence portfolio to fire salvoes
at China pointing out it to be the enemy number one with nuclear missiles trained against India.   The
crumbling of the relationships was so sudden that it revived the fear of resurfacing old animosities in
certain quarters.  The tightening of the Beijing-Islamabad axis naturally flows from the growing asper-
sions between India and China that New Delhi was desirous to break.
The most damaging situation that the political rhetorics than the nuclear tests created in the Sino-
Indian relationships was that it squarely turned all the previous agreement to its head.  The process of
institutionalizing the Sino-Indian relations through confidence building measures with the formation of
Joint Working Committee that has led to the signing of an agreement on the ‘Maintenance of Peace and
Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control in the Sino-Indian Border Areas’ on September 7, 1993
now has gone astray.  Article I of that agreement was of critical importance in building their relations
towards cooperation.  The Article stipulates: ‘Neither side shall use or threaten to use force against the
other by any means (emphasis mine), and that both countries shall ‘strictly respect and observe the line
of actual control between the two sides’ (Agreement, 1993.) By inserting the term by any means in the
agreement they had apparently reach an understanding that nuclear weapons would never surface in
their relationships.  Though China had avoided any reference to the nuclear issue with India, as the latter
then being the non-nuclear weapons state, its universal pledge of no first use was singularly addressed to
assure such state (s) of the Chinese intention despite its capability.
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Following the agreement, commitment was made to reduction of troops to a mutually agreed upon
ceiling, prior notification of military exercises by limiting these exercises in a mutually determined zone
and force level, avoidance of air intrusion with the adoption of various verification measures.  These
measures were further codified during the eighth round of Joint Working Committee meetings in New
Delhi on August 20, 1995.  Subsequently, troops disengagement from four posts located at the trijunc-
ture of Sino-Indian-Bhutanese border was finalized.  Along with this another agreement on CBM was
signed during the Chinese president Jiang Zemin’s visit to India on November 29, 1996 (FBIS, 1998a.)
When in Pakistan, president Zemin retracted from the previous Chinese position on Kashmir suggesting
that the issue is bilateral problem between India and Pakistan and should be resolved accordingly.  In
April 1998, the PLA Chief of the General Staff, Gen.  Fu Quanyou’s ( i.e.  the commander of the PLA’s
land, air and naval forces) mission to India was successfully concluded with China looking for military
to military level cooperation with the latter.
However, the bolt from the blue in May turned everything upside down.  Fernandes’ spats against
China and Vajpayee’s letter to president Clinton publicly downgraded a decade of efforts towards mutu-
al confidence building to mutual apprehension.  It was no resolution to the damage already done by
prime minister Vajpayee’s later correctives in telling the representative of CPI (M) that ‘China was not
the reason why the tests were carried out.’ It is yet to be decided whether it was just an exercise in
defusing the tension created by his previous assertion or an influence of delusion on the security deci-
sion making.  The prophets of arms have finally turned the chimerical Chinese threat into a reality.
Whether nurturing of this threat would serve India’s international image boosting by becoming a global
partner of anti-China lobby is indefinite.  At the moment the South Asian nuclearization has been pro-
jected differently.  President Clinton’s speech in China in June1998 and the joint statement issued at the
end of his visit suggest a different proposition to emerge which may influence the South Asian strategic
course in the coming days (FBIS, 1998b.)
The nuclear tests have also led to the certainty of a considerable level of arms buildup in South Asia.
The region was previously characterized by an unique feature in the conventional arms race in which
India was always racing against itself with Pakistan following the suit.  In the decade of the 1980s India
had emerged as one of the largest arms importers in the world with $30 billion worth of state-of -the -art
weapons under its wings.  Despite the economic sluggishness in the 1990s, it has not lagged behind
ordering $2 billion worth of night vision Hawk fighter aircraft from Britain and negotiate for the long
range SU-30 nuclear capable aircraft from Russian Federation on soft loan.  It has also purchased $800
million worth of spare parts for its ageing weapons from Russia in the recent past.  According to SIPRI
1991 estimate, of the total arms inducted in South Asia in the 1980s, the share of India was 74 percent as
compared with 19 percent of Pakistan.
As circumstance had it, both India and Pakistan were beneficieries of the Soviet invasion in
Afghanistan in December 1979.  Throughout the 1980s, Pakistan’s ‘Frontline State_status qualified it to
receive arms assistance from the United States in the latter’s covert efforts to defeat the Soviets in
Afghanistan that led the Reagan Administration to provide aid package worth $3.2 billion and $3.5 bil-
lion twice to Islamabad.  India received MiG-27s and MiG-29s fighter aircraft along with Main Battle
Tanks, and Aircraft Carrier on lease from the Soviet Union.  Although, Arun Singh (1997), a former
Indian minister of state for Defence during 1985-1989, suggests that there was no evidence of any
increase in defence spending either in India or Pakistan, nor was there any evidence of any significant
weapons systems deployed by either country, the 1980s was indeed a period of arms race between India
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and Pakistan when new weapons systems including Jaguar, Mirage-2000, MiG-27s and 29s, F-16s fight-
er aircraft were inducted in the South Asian strategic landscape ( Smith, 1994.) 
No doubt, there was a falling ratio of defence spending in both India and Pakistan in comparison to
their GDP.  But percentage does not reflect the truth.  Percentagewise, India’s defence spending current-
ly is around 2.5 percent of GDP as compared to Pakistan’s 5 to 6 percent.  India had raised its total
defence spending by 14 percent in 1998/99 amounting to $10 billion and Pakistan had to reciprocate by
raising its defence profile by 8 percent constituting $4 billion.  These figures appear to be miniscule
even in comparison to Japan’s $40 billion plus annual defence budget which constitutes around 1 per-
cent of its GDP.  But Japan’s self-defence force is still not awe-inspiring to any neighbours.  Whereas
the Japanese anxieties with the famine-striken North Korea is well known.
In the Indian context, arguments were made to cut the defence spending further by trimming down
some wasteful indigenous projects.  Some studies had suggested that given the context of rivalries with
Pakistan and currently ensuing military relationships there are rooms for a sizable trimming of Indian
defence spending by 20 to 25 percent (Kaushal, 1995.) This was the case before the nuclear blasts.
After the blasts, India has destroyed its strategic edge with Pakistan by rendering its conventional supe-
riority with acknowledged ratio of 2:1 of the military balance ineffective.  As the logic of deterrence
suggests the conventional forces would be ineffective in the case of war.  Thus, would the technological
momentum gained after the nuclear tests be arrested and both India and Pakistan rest assured without
weaponization and building a sophisticated delivery system to cope with the challenge posed by them-
selves by becoming overt nuclear weapons powers? Can the tide of nuclearization of South Asia be
turned to a matured relations between the adversaries? And would it be possible for India to sustain a
nuclear relationships with China in the future? 
To take the last question first, it would be particularly very difficult for India to turn the nuclear bal-
ance in its favour by bridging the 34 years gap vis-a-vis China without any astronomical amount invest-
ed and without the Chinese passivity.  It is a rule of the nuclear game plan that if nuclear capability is
openly demonstrated the nuclear threat should be made credible.  (This was the situation that led
Pakistan to test.) And whenever a country possesses a nuclear weapon it should be made invulnerable to
the first strike.  This credibility and invulnerability of possessing nuclear weapons can only be achieved
through the development of a triad system, that is encompassing land, air and sea launch capability.
Although, there are some skeptics both in India and Pakistan suggesting that they need not to go the
whole hog in the process of nuclearization, the relative Indian nuclear link vis-a-vis China would surely
be a determining factor pushing India to acquire the triad system.  Thus, arms race in South Asia is
inevitable.
In this case too India would be the first racing against itself.  There would be temptations to India to
go this far because a major nuclear weapons power cannot sit lame duck.  This temptation can push
India to go all out to manufacture huge tonnage thermonuclear bombs for both city busting as well as
counterforce high value targets to destroy the enemy’s air forces and command posts.  The missile accu-
racy as well as first strike capability will have to be added in the nuclear forces operationalization
because of the time lag (3 to 6 minutes) and avoid its own civilian and military posts destruction just by
waiting to receive the enemy’s thrust first.  A massive development of C3I system will have to be fol-
lowed to overcome the lethality of the short time for missile flight or adopt launch on warning system.
And all these would not be the sure shots against the deterrence failure.  Adding these paraphernalia
may require India to raise its defence budget considerably.  Though there is no actual figure arrived at to
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maintain a “credible minimum deterrence,” some conservative estimate suggests, the expenditure would
be around Rs.  40 000 to Rs.  50 000 crores for a period of ten years (Reddy, 1998.) In this case, the
lessons from the history of the Cold War is worth repeating here.  A recent study of the Brookings
Institution estimates that by 1996 the United States has spent almost $5.8 trillion on its nuclear capabili-
ty (Schwartz, 1998).  If the technological momentum of nuclearization gains its upper hand, nobody will
be sure where to stop.  The consequence of the arms race, perhaps will be the ‘most dangerous folly’ in
South Asia ( TE, October 17, 1998).
Given the present economic crunch in South Asia, it would be imprudent to think about the possibility
of nuclear arms race.  But the nuclear tests were in itself not economically viable even if technically pos-
sible.  Economies of both India and Pakistan were never in a position to sustain the armament process
even at the conventional level.  The resultant effect of this has been their growing indebtedness and
dependency on foreign sources of supply.  India’s outstanding external debt, according to the Asian
Development Bank, was $104.3 billion in 1995.  With the debt servicing ratio around 25 percent of its
GDP and the debt inputs from the external sources constituting around 22 percent of its GNP, it is hard-
ly likely for India to speed up its nuclear weapons power stature.  Similarly, the plight of the Pakistani
economy is all there to see after May 1998.  Pakistan is finding difficulties in repaying its $36 billion
foreign debt that constitutes 72 percent of its GDP.  It is facing difficulties in debt servicing which is
around $360 million a month.  Debt servicing eats up 45 percent of the total governmental expenditure.
Servicing debt has also outstripped annual defence expenditure in Pakistan.  Reportedly, the government
is trying hard to negotiated with the IMF seeking to reschedule $7.7 billion debt.  The Pakistan govern-
ment also expects an external financial gap of $19 billion between 1999 and 2001 (FT, January 28,
1999.) Pakistan’s uncertain future has now become glaring with its leadership’s inability to rule the
country as the cases of handing over of power to the military to manage economic affairs through estab-
lishing military courts in a democracy show (FEER, January 14, 1999).
Thus, there is a feeling in India: ‘Can Pakistan survive the arms race?’ With the American sanctions
over its head and the country itself reeling under economic crisis Pakistan would not be in a position to
hike its defence expenditure.  It is also thought in the South Asian context that the nuclear deterrence
will help to reduce conventional defence expenditure.  But these are the misconstrued optimism.  South
Asia had talked about the recessed nuclear deterrence since 1974 and claimed no war occurred in the
region for nearly a quarter century since 1971 Bangladesh crisis because of the existential deterrence
between India and Pakistan.  Like in Europe where conventional high-tech weaponry was deployed with
speed across the Berlin Wall throughout the Cold War period, the quarter of century of peace through
nuclear deterrence had witnessed the manifold acceleration in arms imports in South Asia after 1971
that receeded only in the early 1990s.  There is no reason to suggest why the case would not be repeated
in the nuclear context and the arms race stopped.  Perhaps India could initiate a nuclear arms race in
South Asia with a intention leading to the collapse of Pakistan a la Soviet Union in competition with the
United States.  But, according to one Pakistani scholar, ‘India will find, too late, that it has created a
South Asian nuclear Somalia for a neighbour,’ (Hoodbhoy, 1998) in doing so.
Despite this would the intrinsic destructive power of the nuclear weapons preserve security in South
Asia’ The nuclear weapons, in the final analysis, have the potentiality of increasing rather than decreas-
ing insecurity in South Asia because the regional problem of insecurity is domestic.  The nuclear
weapon has not prevented the growing ethno-political and sectarian violence in the region.  Particularly,
in India, the sectarian violence and the struggle for self-determination feature the Kashmir crisis which
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is festering in the 1990s.  Although, India has publicly claimed the problems in Kashmir have been insti-
gated by Pakistan, the fact however remains that the fertile ground for the alleged involvement of
Pakistan in Kashmir has been created by the failure of leadership in India to develop a coherent policy
for the social inclusion of the people.  The denial of democracy in Kashmir has cost India to engage
more than 300 000 armed forces there to hold on Kashmir.  The unending conflict in Kashmir has a
mark on Indian security strategy leading it to take several unsuccessful measures in constraining the
eruption of violence such as the festering battles of May-July 1999 with fatalities of more than a thou-
sand soldiers across the LoAC and the death of unknown number of mujaheedin guerrilla fighters in
Kashmir.  Indian armed forces are overstretched in Kashmir as well as other areas of turmoil and unrest
like in Assam and the Northeast.  Recurring political violence with ethno-religious and separatist over-
tones has compelled India to engage 25 of its army’s 35 Divisions in domestic security maintenance
duty.  Likewise, the case of Pakistan in Sind and Baluchistan is the same.  Insecurity and challenges to
the governments in South Asia are moreover internal than external.  Nuclear weapons cannot be used to
eliminate the threat emanating from the socio-political instabilities in the domestic realm.  But the
nuclear weapons can again facilitate the continuation of the low intensity conflict to destabilize the
regional neighbourhood under the assumption that it prevents the major war from occurring as it was the
case recently.
Since 1971, Pakistan’s security strategy vis-a-vis India has been to change the track from directly con-
fronting India to probing the Indian military might through low intensity conflict in disturbed areas.
This policy has been successfully implemented first in Punjab and now in Kashmir which has consider-
ably constrained the superior arms might of India.  The overt nuclear status of both these countries may
not change this situation.  Because the problems have to be domestically addressed and internally
resolved.  The painful reality for the future of South Asia is that the nuclear arms race, once unleased,
will eat up the large chunk of pie from the social sectors further pushing the people in the region to live
under abject poverty and destitution.  No remedies to their woes will be in sight once their leaders live in
the make-believe world of nuclear deterrence.  And deterrence will be a fundamental policy to create
strategic instability in the region.
Future Imperilled
Then, in whose interest should India and Pakistan possess nuclear weapons? Would it essentially be a
policy to reduce their mutual aspersions? Or would it be a policy to achieve certain intangible objectives
such as non-discriminatory non-proliferation regime or delegitimization of nuclear weapons which will
be essentially irrelevant in the context of their strategic disputes in South Asia (Dhruba Kumar, 1996.)
The conflicts ensuing between India and Pakistan would not be resolved with the possession of nuclear
weapons, nor would this be the case of India with China.  China has no strategic ambitions south of the
Himalayas.  Throughout its recorded history of over four thousand year there is no record of Chinese
invasion of India.  China’s territorial claims are based on the historical facts which India has counter-
poised with legality.  China had already possessed what it has claimed.  Unless India tries to reclaim the
Aksai Chin with the use of force, any reimagining of conflicts breaking out into war between China and
India would be farfetched.  Besides the CBMs that India and China had signed and implemented to
defuse tensions surrounding the border issue, the Chinese strategists in Beijing were also well aware of
the superior Indian military disposition across the border in comparison to the PLA’s near-obsolate
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weaponry (Liu and Guo, 1998.)
Likewise, the potentiality of Indian nuclear threat was not hidden from both the civilian and military
strategists in China.  However, the government in Beijing had pursued diplomacy to defuse any unto-
ward misunderstanding with its beleagured neighbour.  Even in nuclear energy field China had been
conciliatory to India’s needs.  China had supplied the required light water fuel to run the Tarapur nuclear
plants of India at a time when New Delhi faced considerable pressure from the United States to accept
the comprehensive full-scope nuclear safeguards to renew the low enriched fuel supplies.  Whatever
may have been the Chinese motive in supplying ten tonnes of low enriched uranium in 1995, the signifi-
cance in this new thrust in their relationship cannot be overlooked.
The maddening thrust of Indian policy makers to point a finger against China therefore appears to be
deliberately searching an enemy to be focused in the world as a power and treated equally.  Such an
impropitious posture adopted by India may lead to a serious reappraisal in China’s strategic equation in
South Asia.  Indications are already there that the government in China is more infuriated by the Indian
prime minister Vajpayee’s reference to the 1962 border war alleging China to be an aggressor than by
the former’s nuclear tests.  This testifies, for the Chinese policy makers, a collapse of understandings
reached through all the bilateral Confidence Building Measures between the two.  A dramatic change in
China’s strategic posture against India can be expected in the case of India’s development and deploy-
ment of delivery systems targeting China in the near future.  But for a considerable period, the Chinese
thrust would be confined to forge a multilateral collaboration with other nuclear weapons powers in
developing mechanisms to constrain the burgeoning nuclear threat from India.  China had long experi-
ence in having lived with actual nuclear threat from both the superpowers.  For the present, China may
not be in hurry to deploy nuclear weapons in Tibet in contemplation of Indian moves.  It would not,
however, be a surprise if the Chinese would start considering the positioning of long-range missiles suf-
ficient enough to cover India.  Perhaps this would be the intended fall out of the nuclearized Indian mili-
tary posture generating strategic instability across the Himalayas.
On the other side of the ledger, a stable political order both in India and Pakistan is the premium need
even to prevent accidental nuclear war.  South Asia today stands at the lunatic fringe with nuclear pride
and historical prejudice.  Political instability at the centre has created fractured bureaucracy with fragile
economic base coupled with increasing social anomalies that may lead to domestic upheavals with the
coming to power of pathologically anti-Indian and anti-Pakistani ‘Taliban-like’ fundamentalist groups in
these countries.  Given the rise of the BJP to power from 2 parliamentary seats in 1984 to 178 seats in
1998, one never knows what will happen in secular India if BJP will be in power for two more parlia-
mentary terms.  Islamic Pakistan is not an exception in this sense.  The India-hating Jamat-I-Islam is
making inroads in the Pakistani politics with the failure of moderate governments there.  As is well
known, both the Muslim League and the Bhartiya Janata Party constituting the die-hard Islamic as well
as Hindu fundamentalists have their origins even before the partition in 1947.  Therefore, they have also
their old scores to settle.
Thus, in their nuclear relationships what India and Pakistan should urgently think up is to avoid
unwanted war inadvertently stepping into their doorsteps.  If war were to be fought at the conventional
level either of the countries will not last more than three week period, with their shrinking supplies and
the fragile economies to sustain the war efforts at the rate of multi-million dollars a day.  Though it
would be difficult to arrive at actual cost incurred by war on daily basis, one can safely assume that the
military expenses would increase tremendously by looking at the Indian military efforts in Kargil esti-
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mated at $ 4 million a day, excluding the cost of weaponry losses including the two MiG-29 fighters
downed by Pakistan.  If Kargil can cost $ 4 million a day and comparable expenditure on the side of
Pakistan, an allout war could multiply the cost several fold which will strap economies of both countries
equally to the catastrophies of war.  An earlier estimate published in the India Today had put a single
day of fighting Pakistan would cost India approximately $400 million (Ganguly, 1990/91.)
War avoidance could only occur through reinvigorating confidence buildings and the cooling off of
the festering Kashmir problem through mutual agreement.  Kashmir’s independence is much jinxed both
in India and Pakistan.  But neither is prepared to let the Kashmiri people live in peace.  As the ten week
long battles (May-July 1999) in Kashmir subsided efforts at resumption of dialogue between India and
Pakistan are hijacked by the intermittant fightings as well as the war hysteria caused by the impending
September elections in India.  The BJP will be hellbent to make a smooth transaction of the counterfeit
currency of Kargil ‘vijay abhiyan’ (victory campaigns) in buying ballots to win election.  India’s care-
taker prime minister Vajapayee  had, therefore, dismissed any resumption of talks with Pakistan unless
the latter stops backing Muslim separatists in Kashmir.  While on a election campaign on August 7,
1999, Vajpayee had even urged the United States to declare Pakistan a ‘terrorist state.’ On the other
hand, it was ironic for Pakistan to refrain from any responsibility for the latest conflict in Kashmir but
broadcast official withdrawal speech by the prime minister Nawaz Sharif on the national television; rally
troops by visiting the front by telling Pakistani soldiers that the disputed region of Kashmir one day will
be part of their country.  He linked the nuclear issue with the conflict in Kashmir on June 23, 1999 by
saying that the ‘nuclear and missile technology have given us great courage.’ Even if one were to under-
stand the imperatives of elections and domestic compulsions making it difficult for either parties agree
to begin fresh negotiations, the terms of engagement have to be found with due consideration for pre-
venting further escalation of conflict.  But this is not the way reflecting policy moves either in India or
Pakistan.  The downing of a Pakistani reconniassance aircraft Atlantique over the Sir Creek area by an
Indian Airforce Jet on August 10, 1999 is a testimony to an invitation of further instability in the securi-
ty relations between the two countries.  A state of belligerency has enveloped the 52nd anniversary cele-
brations for independence in both India and Pakistan by turning the entire Indo-Pak border into a war
zone.  Again the electoral politics in India is certainly to capitalize on the enemy image of Pakistan let-
ting no chance for a melt down of the high tension.
The present stalemate demands two-prong strategy for India to consider.  On the one hand it has to
resume dialogue with Pakistan immediately to cool off the heat with the display of reasonableness by
reinvigorating the contents of the Lahore Declaration.  On the other hand, gaining of the lost confidence
of the Kashmiri people should be made the highest priority of the government of India to lessen the fear
engulfing the state through the massive presence of security forces and their unlawful activities.  It
should be clearly recognized that being increasingly capable of turning Kashmir into an occupied state
militarily would not provide India with the required legitimacy to prove the perpetuity of Kashmir’s
accession to it.  Previously India had wasted its time, energies, resources and manpower, particularly
since 1972, in preparation for transforming the LoAC into an international border by inversely challeng-
ing its own assertion of the state of Kashmir being an integral part of the Indian Union.  Perhaps, India’s
position in Kashmir would have been very different today had it ever presumed that the denial of
democracy to the Kashmiri people and the record of human rights violations would not only jeopardise
its secular identity but also fracture the question of territorial integrity.
For India, it is not a time to celebrate the ‘Vijay’ (victory) over Pakistan after the trauma and predica-
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ment in Dras-Kargil sectors but a time for a fair introspection on its past failures in Kashmir and restruc-
ture a relationships with the Kashmiri people irrespective of their political creed, ethno-religious identi-
ties, and win back their confidence.  Otherwise India would face a Sisipyusian task to hold on the
indigenous Kashmiri Azadi (freedom) movement merely on the strength of its coercive state apparatus-
es.  Evidently, the present crisis over Kashmir has fairly demonstrated the fact that India’s hold on the
state is as tenuous as it ever was.  Further weakening of the civilian authority in the Kashmiri state
would be the consequence of the Indian military entrenchment along the LoAC.  It would make any
chance of normalcy and civilian governance in Kashmir to return more difficult in the predictable future.
Next, Pakistan should be given a fair chance to survive economically.  Despite the governmental
report to the contrary, independent studies suggest Pakistan as a bankrupt state (Jalal, 1999), whose for-
eign exchange reserve hovers only around $1 billion (TE, May 22, 1999.) Unlike in the case of India,
Pakistan’s nuclear programme was established with military overtones.  It has no other civilian purpose
than directly countering the Indian security challenges.  The voices against the cost involving overt
nuclearization and arms race are thinning out against the reality of ensuing conflict with India.
Pakistan’s weaponization process would certainly be rationalized against the fall out of Kargil debacle.
As the Pakistani Information minister Mushahid Hussain asserts that India would have crossed the
LoAC had not Pakistan possessed nuclear weapons, the future entails a thrust for weaponization and
deployment despite economic difficulties.  Understandably, Ayesha Jalal also expresses similar opinion
forcing the Pakistani leadership to test their nuclear devices.  Accordingly, she says, ‘A war with India
would be far worse than the impact of any economic sanctions.  The nuclear weapons at least had the
merit of removing Pakistan’s conventional disadvantages in a military exchange with India (Jalal, 1999.)
As the tests evidently show that the economic rationale behind not testing was an unattractive proposi-
tion in May 1998, the economic cost of nuclearization on the people would be less tangible in the
Pakistani state’s determination to prevent war with India and preserve national security.  The arguments
mustered so far explains Pakistan’s strategy would resemble that of France or second tiered nuclear
weapons powers with the advocacy of ‘deterrence of the strong by the weak.’ In principle, this would be
an undisputed strategy for Pakistan to pursue.  But the vexing questions of its effectiveness remain.  If
deterrence were to be effective the rudimentary power of nuclear possession should grow with credibili-
ty and the cost would be undubitably staggering.
Some nuclear hawks in India have fairly advocated their country to pursue a strategy of mounting
pressure against Pakistan by massing heavily armed troops along the border and missile deployment  in
entraping Pakistan and bleed its economy white.  The decision to integrate Agni-II missiles into India’s
defence arsenal announced by prime minister Vajpayee in his Independence Day speech on August 15,
1999 is surely to raise the mercury of anxiety and temper.  Subsequently, a draft of India’s Nuclear
Doctrine publicised by the National Security Advisory Board on August 17, 1999 clearly spelt out that a
triad system would be a nuclear strategy for India to pursue.  Thus, there would be no stopping to the
nuclear arms race in South Asia with severe consequences on the economies of both India and Pakistan.
And Pakistan’s economic collapse is linked with this thrust of Indian policy to acquire a nuclear second
strike capability with the development of the sea based Sagarika nuclear tipped missiles.
Such an Indian strategy would certainly be complimentary to Pakistan’s need of not only matching
Indian nuclear design but also in the evolution of a most conservative regime.  Although there exists no
hard evidence to support the argument that Pakistan would be left alone, isolated, and high and dry to
face the Indian nuclear threat, there are some international imperatives which may not let Pakistan down
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and go bust.  The first is the Pakistan’s Islamic connections that may rise to the occasion if Islamic states
would lead to feel that India has stepped out of its shoes.  Second, despite the dubious strategic value
that Pakistan presents to the United States in the post-Cold War period, its geographical landscape
touching the Persian Gulf and the Central Asian states has not devalued its importance in the wider
geopolitical setting.  Whatever the sense of delusion that prevails in Pakistan about its alliance relations
with the United States presently, there is a cognizance of the fact in the country that the American role
in South Asia would increase along with the increase in India’s strategic clout.  A summation of such an
American posture for South Asia can be found in the Pentagon’s assertion of early 1990s that the US
would undertake every possible measure to prevent Indian hegemonism in the region (NYT, March 8,
1992.) Therefore, the possibility of the revival of a ‘constructive military relations’ with Pakistan, to
promote a stable security condition in Southwest and Central Asia, cannot be negated in order to sustain
the Pakistani state.  Third, the excessive Indian military pressure on Pakistan may extremely encourage
Islamic fundamentalism as an unintended consequence of militarization which India, China as well as
the United States disapprove of in this crucial region.  Pakistan, therefore, presents a complex web of
spider’s net for both the regional and international stability.  The need in India, therefore, is to discour-
age any emotive strategic moves for short term expediency in the interests of the long term regional sta-
bility.
Were Pakistan to fall and disintegrate the repercussion in South Asia would be no less devastating.
The human construct of nationalism on the basis of ‘Hinduvta’ in India and ‘Islam’ in Pakistan has led
both of them to possess the ‘absolute weapon’ of mass destruction.  But what next? Would the nuclear
nationalism with a coat of religious and cultural superiority of either faith be the determining factor in
the evolution of Indo-Pak relations in the future? The chilling possibility of such a relationship would be
that the political fragility with weak governments may further lead to instability putting their interac-
tions on a hair-trigger alert.  This situation would clearly demand the leaderships in both countries to
think over the need to avoid the nuclear use - both authorised or unauthorised.
Road to Nowhere
In summing up, it is argued here that the May 1998 nuclear weapons tests in South Asia lacked securi-
ty rationale and, in reality, it achieved nothing substantial in terms of enhancing security.  One strategic
rationale advocated by India is that it would like to be secure in an uncertain as well as anarchic world.
Reasonably, the invocation of the Chinese threat is point to be considered in this context.  Likewise, one
has also to think over the question that would the possession of nuclear weapons and the accompanying
retaliatory threat minimize the perceived Chinese belligerency’ Yet there is no evidence to prove this to
be correct.  Similarly, India’s widely talked about “minimum nuclear deterrence” has to evolve with
acquisition of retaliatory capability particularly against China which merely bombs’ possession cannot
guarantee.  Acquisition of nuclear weapons is not synonymous to deterrence credibility.  It could per-
haps be an impediment in arriving at any reasonable understanding with China in resolving their out-
standing border dispute because of the provocative nature of deterrence strategy (Stein, 1991.)
Equally, the status rationale for nuclear weapons tests by India stands contrary to the evidence.  India
has seemingly linked the great power status with the nuclear weapons possession.  By this logic, if India
were to be a great power Pakistan would be a natural suitor.  Also, India’s contention that China was
conferred a great power status because of being a nuclear weapons power is simply a misreading of the
South Asia After The Nuclear Tests 53
history.  China was already a great power without nuclear weapons with representation at the United
Nations Security Council as well as General Assembly in the shape of Taiwan.  India had helped restore
the rights to represent the Peoples’ Republic at these institutions in 1971 despite its chilly relations with
China caused by the 1962 war, 1964 nuclear tests and the subsequent Cultural Revolution turmoil.
Perhaps the rationale to the nuclear weapons tests could be found in the explicit Hinduised identity
formation of India to do away with its long standing victimized image by the muslim hordes as well as
the white imperialists.  The bomb decision that prime minister Vajpayee took was a reflection of a
young and poetic Vajpayee whose poetry was publicized in a small pamphlet entitled “Angry Hindu!
Yes, Why Not?” circulated back in 1988, viewing the bomb as:
This is the identity of the Hindu body, the Hindu soul and the Hindu life,
I am that rage of Shankar, which can destroy the earth and reduce it to ashes,
I am the devastating sound of his drum to which death dances,
I am the unquenched thirst of the goddess of war, I am the divine laughter of Durga,
I am the doomsday call of the god of death, the burning fire from the funeral pyre,
If with this fire raging inside me, I burn the earth,
And the water, earth, soil, sky go up in flames on their own, do not be surprised (cited in Nandy,
1998.)
If one were to believe this as the credible explanation for nuclear test by India it contains the seed of
further discord than reconciliation in the regional relationships.  May be this is an aggressive polemical
posture that Vajpayee as the prime minister would not allow to prevail.  But, given the case of demoniz-
ing of Pakistan in India, one can only hope that their bloody past would not remain at daggers drawn
stage and get sucked into an arms race in the next millennium.
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ABSTRACT 
The frustrated but status driven mindset of the Indian policy makers has finally led South Asia to wrap itself into
a nuclear fold by further opening strategic vulnerabilities between India and Pakistan. The perceived threat from
China by India has also equally complicated the calculus of deterrence relationships in the formation of a nuclear
triangle by enlarging the circumference of regional conflict and by imprudently encouraging the possibility of
strategic instability between India and China. Therefore, the Indian nuclear tests and the subsequent counter tests by
Pakistan in May 1998 have definitely generated insecurity as evidenced by the festering conflicts leading to deepen
the strategic schism between India and Pakistan in particular. South Asia awaits a bleak not a bright future.
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